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Introduction	  
Proven-in-use arguments are needed when pre-developed products with an in-service history 
are to be used in different environments than those they were originally developed for. Particular 
cases may include 
• commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components that are to be used in safety contexts 
• pre-developed products that have been certified by a different standard or against 
different requirements 
• products that have originally been certified to a lower level of integrity but are to be used 
for higher levels of integrity 
A product may include software modules or may be stand-alone integrated hardware and 
software modules. 
IEC 61508-7 [1] includes as Annex D a proposal for the evaluation of software reliability based 
on a simple statistical model. However, this annex is discussed quite controversially and is 
currently under revision. EN 50129 [2] also contains recommendations on how to demonstrate 
high confidence by use, but without any further explanation. For example, for SIL 3 and 4, “1 
million hours operation time, at least 2 years experience with different equipments including 
safety analysis, detailed documentation also of minor changes during operation time” is 
recommended. 
 
The topic itself is not new [3, 4], but most recent approaches have been based on elementary 
probability such as urn models which lead to very restrictive requirements for the system or 
software to which it has been applied [7]. We have only become aware during the process of 
writing this paper that much earlier work has been performed with a different approach [15].  
 
Also, there has been considerable confusion about the term “software reliability”. Therefore, the 
authors want to state very clearly: software does not fail, only physical systems can fail. So, 
unless software is executed on hardware, we cannot refer to failure. 
 
The aim of this paper is to base the argumentation on a general mathematical model, so that 
the results can be applied to a very general class of products without unnecessary limitations. 
The advantage of such an approach is also that the same requirements would hold for a broad 
class of products. 
Preprint 
Mathematical	  model	  
In this section, we provide a simple model of a pre-developed product. It consists of software 
and hardware. Hardware is relatively easy to consider. It exhibits random failures and 
systematic failures. As for random failures, it is necessary to deal with aging, wear and tear, and 
comparable effects that lead to a possibly dangerous failure of the hardware. Since there are a 
large number of influences such as material, load, use etc., the failure time is random. This is 
modeled by distributions such as exponential distribution, Weibull distribution and many other 
models, e.g. see [10]. 
 
Furthermore, the hardware may contain systematic faults. We will treat those together with 
software errors. Normally, if a component has been developed according to a standard for 
functional safety, it is assumed that such methods have been used that systematic failures can 
be neglected, compared with random failures. However, for pre-developed components, this 
assumption might not hold. Therefore, we need to consider systematic failures of the hardware. 
 
For software, we will now use the following model. In order to simplify the situation, we will 
assume that there are no randomization procedures in the software, as reading system time, 
using uninitialized variables, and using data in memory cells and other data that might result in a 
random influence on the software. These processes, also chaotic processes used for example 
for random number generation, could be discussed separately. 
 
With these assumptions, the software could be imagined as a deterministic system. This system 
adopts a new state for each processor step. Obviously, the state of the software would depend 
on the previous states of the software. Here, “state” means the values of all registers, counters, 
pointers etc. This means we do not assume that the software fulfils the Markov property. In that 
case, the next state of the software would only depend on the previous step and not on the 
history. Now, we need to take into account the fact that the state of the software would also 
depend on the input data. 
 
Hence, we have a space of input values E and a space of output values A. We can express the 
input values as a sequence Ei, i=1,... Now, the software provides a deterministic mapping An = 
F(En, En-1,..., Ei,...,E1). This mapping is subjective. Now, there exist n+1 tuples (An, En, En-
1,..., Ei,...,E1) that are either correct (C) or incorrect (N). This is just a reflection of the software 
errors that are present. So, the entire space (An, En, En-1,..., Ei,...,E1) for all n is subdivided 
into two parts: C and N. Usually, C would have a much larger size than N. Size here means the 
number of points. It needs to be understood that there would be a very large number of points in 
a space. That means, if we chose at random a point from the set of all possible (An, En, En-1,..., 
Ei,...,E1), we would only rarely be in N.  
 
Inputs E1, E2, etc., can be considered as random. However, their distribution influences how 
often the software status would belong to subspace N. It is not necessary that the distribution of 
E1, E2, etc., is a uniform distribution. Only the realizations of sequences E1, E2, … must be 
such that the distribution of the occurrences of a state in N and C are the same under different 
circumstances. Of course, if sequence E1, E2, always has the same distribution function, the 
distribution of the occurrence times of a state in N would be the same. Then, the inter-arrival 
times of states in N would be exponentially distributed since that is a rare event.  
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If the software states form a random walk in the space N u C, then a state in N is achieved as a 
random peak, which usually occurs with exponentially distributed inter-arrival times. 
In order to come to a result based on the complicated structure of the software, we assume the 
following: 
• The software failures are decoupled so that we can assume that they can be considered 
as being independent of each other. 
• The fraction of failures in the software is small so that they should occur only rarely. 
When the software is then subject to exterior influence, it could be possible to model the 
occurrence of each of the N software errors with one counting process, say Xi (t). This process 
counts the failures of the software and is a renewal process, e.g. see [10] for the mathematical 
explanation of a renewal process. In fact, it means that the inter-arrival times of a software 
failure would have an arbitrary distribution and they would be independent. This choice can be 
motivated by the two assumptions above.  
The overall counting process of all software errors (they show up as failures) is then 
X(t) = Σ Xi(t), 
where the total runs over i. Now, we can apply Grigelionis’ theorem [12].  
If E(Xi) = t/ai 
Σ 1/ai → λ for any fixed t 
sup(Xi(B)>=1) → 0 as n → ∞ for every bounded set B of the time interval [0, ∞), 
then X(t) converges to a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ. 
This motivates many of the old software models using Poisson processes, see [9], Section 10. 
They are homogeneous Poisson processes if there are no changes and then all inter-arrival 
times of the states in N are exponentially distributed. If the software changes, e.g. improves, the 
occurrence rate changes and a non-homogeneous Poisson process is used. 
What does Grigelionis’ theorem mean practically? 
• The software needs to be subject to an exterior influence that can be considered as 
random so that the software errors are triggered randomly. 
• The occurrence probability of a single software error must be sufficiently small and the 
occurrence of different software errors must be considered as independent. 
• The process of triggering software errors must be stationary. 
• If a software failure occurs, the system is restarted and operates further on. 
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Note: If the software is changed, the stationarity assumption does not hold any more. It is then 
possible to find other models for reliability growth based, for example, on a non-homogeneous 
Poisson process, e.g. see [9]. 
Several variants of such limit theorems exist [18], e.g. the classic Palm-Khintchine theorem. 
Besides these simple models, other more complicated models exist that take into account a 
certain structure of the software, e.g. see [15]. Here, the software structure is modeled as a 
semi-Markov process, with software modules taking the role of states and control being 
transferred between the software modules. It is assumed that there may be failures within the 
modules with failure processes being a Poisson process. Also, the transfer of control may be 
subject to failure. The resulting process is quite complex, but again the limiting process is a 
Poisson process. The major requirement on which the result is based is that the modules and 
the transfer of control are very reliable, meaning that failures are rare and the failure rates of 
both processes are much lower than the switching rate. 
We will now treat systematic hardware failures in the same manner as software failures. A 
systematic hardware failure is always present in the hardware and waits until its activation by an 
exterior trigger. This is comparable with the activation of a software error. However, it needs to 
be taken into account that, after the occurrence of a hardware fault, the system might fail and 
cannot be restored very easily to a working state. If it is repaired, comparable arguments as for 
the software might hold. 
For many proven-in-use arguments, exponential distribution is used. This is then motivated by 
the Poisson process describing the failure counts of the systems under study. 
It is necessary to distinguish between two aspects here. 
A Poisson process is a failure counting process of a repairable system. That means a system is 
“repaired”, e.g. by restarting it after a software failure, and, since influence on the system is 
random and the detected software error is activated seldom, we can just neglect the effect of it 
being activated a second time. After the occurrence of a hardware failure, the system is 
minimally repaired, i.e. just the failed item is replaced. 
The assumption of stationarity, however, does not allow aging to be used in the model. 
The Poisson process has the property that the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed, 
which makes the use of statistical models very easy. 
Note: It is necessary to distinguish the Poisson counting process from an exponential 
distribution that is used for the lifetime statistics of a non-repairable system, e.g. see [13]. 
Now, a short note is provided on how to take into account possible internal sources of random 
influence as intentionally or unintentionally introduced random number generators. They can be 
treated in the set-up as described above in the same manner as the exterior random influences. 
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Examples	  
The Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine which was involved in at least six incidents 
between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation. The 
operational experience as reported by [6] started in 1982 with a total of 11 units. The details 
have not been reported, but for the example we assume that each unit was in operation on 
average for less than half the period between 1983 and 1987, say in total 20 unit-years. 
Assuming 250 operating days per year and 20 patients per day, we might assume 100,000 
individual cases of treatment. For the sake of simplicity of the argument, let us assume that all 
qualitative requirements for proven-in-use arguments are fulfilled (which was probably not true 
in this case).  
Let us assume we would pursue a proven-in-use argument on June 2, 1985, the day before the 
first incident, and that half  the reported operational experience would have been gained. This 
would amount to about 50,000 flawless operating hours, which is an order of magnitude far 
removed from the minimum number of operating hours demanded for a SIL 1 claim [1] (300,000 
operating hours without dangerous failures would be required). For a comparison, let us regard 
the data collected until January 17, 1987. Here, we would have doubled the number of 
operating hours, but we had six failures and probably software modifications, so the results 
would be even worse. 
Two particular software failures were reported as root causes of the incidents [6]: 
1. One failure only occurred when a particular non-standard sequence of keystrokes was 
entered on the terminal … within eight seconds. This sequence of keystrokes was 
improbable… it took some practice before operators were able to work quickly enough to 
trigger this failure mode. 
2. In a second failure scenario, the software set a flag variable by incrementing it, rather 
than by setting it to a fixed non-zero value. Occasionally, an arithmetic overflow 
occurred, causing the flag to return to zero and the software to bypass safety checks. 
These scenarios are similar in that there was a fault in the software from the very start, which 
was only triggered under a very particular environmental condition that is more or less of a 
random nature. So, it is reasonable to assume that the overall system behavior appeared 
randomly to an outsider, as it was triggered by an operational condition (e.g. particular treatment 
or particular set of parameters) and an error condition in the software which was triggered only 
with a particular probability (e.g. probability that the flag returned to 0). So, the overall failure 
behavior could be described by a possibly time-dependent failure rate 𝜆 𝑡 . 
Ariane 4 was an expendable launch system which had 113 successful launches between 1988 
and 2003 (and three failures) [17]. Its successor’s test flight, Ariane 5 flight 501, failed on June 
4, 1996, because of a malfunction in the control software. A data conversion caused a 
processor trap (operand error). The software was originally written for Ariane 4 where efficiency 
considerations (the computer running the software had an 80% maximum workload 
requirement) led to four variables being protected with a handler while three others, including 
the horizontal bias variable, were left unprotected because it was thought that they were 
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"physically limited or that there was a large margin of error". The software, written in Ada, was 
included in Ariane 5 through the reuse of an entire Ariane 4 subsystem. As a result of a 
qualitative proven-in-use argument, the extent of testing and validation effort was reduced. 
Ariane 5 reused the inertial reference platform, but Ariane 5's flight path differed considerably 
from that of Ariane 4. Specifically, Ariane 5's greater horizontal acceleration caused the 
computers on both the back-up and primary platforms to crash and emit diagnostic data 
misinterpreted by the autopilot as spurious position and velocity data. 
Let us assume that the component worked error-free in all 116 missions (the three losses had 
other causes) and that a mission would last on average one hour. It is clear that this operational 
experience is far removed from any reasonable SIL claim but it is interesting to note that, in this 
example, the change in operational environment would have invalidated any argument based on 
operational experience. In addition, the component was integrated into a different system, which 
would also have to be argued as sufficiently similar. 
Summary	  and	  conclusions	  
We have seen in the previous section that different and independent approaches lead to the 
same result, a limiting Poisson distribution, under very general requirements. And we are sure 
that, if we put in more work, we could even expand the results. 
The situation is very similar to the central limit theorems in statistics. If there is no dominant 
influence or considerable dependence among the random variables, their normalized sum then 
tends to a normal limit distribution under very general assumptions. If some of the assumptions 
do not hold or we combine them with other functions, other limiting distributions would then 
occur, e.g. extreme value distributions. 
So, we are back to the well-known Poisson assumptions, but we can relax them due to the limit 
theorem quoted above. It is well-known that the Poisson process arises when the following four 
assumptions hold: 
 
1. Proportionality: The probability of observing a single event over a small interval is 
approximately proportional to the size of that interval. 
2. Singularity: The probability of two events occurring in the same narrow interval is negligible. 
3. Homogeneity: The probability of an event within a certain interval does not change over 
different intervals. 
4. Independence: The probability of an event in one interval is independent of the probability of 
an event in any other non-overlapping interval. 
 
For a particular application, it is sufficient that these assumptions hold approximately and are 
plausible. The singularity requirement needs no discussion; it will be fulfilled in any system with 
reasonable operational experience. The proportionality and homogeneity assumptions may be 
weakened, still resulting in a Poisson process, as the limit theorems hold for even the 
superposition of general renewal processes. However, the components must be well tested and 
be reasonably error-free as the limit theorems demand rare failure events. The independence 
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and the stationarity requirements are more restrictive. They mean in particular that the 
environment must not change significantly and that the components regarded should be very 
similar. In particular, the Ariane 4 example has illustrated the problem concerning changes in 
the environment. And Therac 25 has shown that, when the system itself is changed, the 
operational experience may be very limited and may not even be sufficient to claim SIL 1. In 
both examples, we have assumed a working complaint management system which would be 
another issue to be discussed. 
Since many standards (e.g. see [1]) and approaches use the Poisson process and the 
assumptions stated in the section above, we can now specify the requirements that must be 
necessarily fulfilled to apply such a proven-in-use approach: 
• The main requirement is the random influence of the environment on the component and 
that it must be representative. This means that a component which is used for a proven-
in-use argument must be in a typical environment for this type of component and the 
environment must be such that the influences are typical for this type of use, including all 
the changes in it. So, all components must be operated at least in similar environments. 
And all components compared must be similar. In particular, this means that, if bugs are 
fixed, the component has usually to be regarded as a different component. 
• All failures must be recorded and it must be possible to observe them. 
• All lifetimes and times of use must be recorded. It must also be recorded when a unit is 
out of service for a certain time interval and also when it is not used any more. 
All these three points are nothing else than the requirements for a good statistical sample as 
can be found in good statistical textbooks, e.g. [14], and they do not differ from earlier results 
such as [3] or [15]. 
It is very interesting that the conclusion was already known in 1975 [16]: “This amounts to giving 
carte blanche to the reliability engineer to assume a Poisson distribution in such situations”. And 
also another conclusion is still valid: “… it is common practice to make this assumption willy-nilly 
– the results contained here simply confirm the engineer’s intuition”. We wholeheartedly agree 
with this conclusion and so should also standardization committees, making life for engineers as 
easy as possible with minimum requirements, but having the assessors ensure that these 
requirements are really fulfilled. That this may still not be an easy task is finally illustrated by 
examples. 
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